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Before 1887 existed in Holland a codification of the emergency law which was of French
orign and which went back to 1791 and 1811 respectively.By including article 187 in the
Constitution of 1887, the possibility was created to announce ttre state of war or state of
martial law by or on behalf of the King in order to maintain the national security of the
country. This law would deal with both the ways and situations in which this was to be
effected. This was realized in 1899 by the establishment of the War Law.
This organic law had come a long way. Amongst other causes, this was due to various
cabinet changes and the concomitant ministerial changes in the War Department. Futher-
moÍe, in the period at issue defence matters did not receive high priority on the shortlist of
the governmenl Also of influence was the fact that the government, in drafting the War
Law, had the intention to pass maximum authority from civil to military authorities during
the state of war or state of martial law. The Parliament was sceptical, for fear of being
degraded to a nominal figure in the event of extraordinary statutory conditions. The main
cause of the slow legislative proceedings however was that the government was
inexperienced with codification of the emergency law. The central issue was which
situations were to be governed by the law and in which way this was to be effected.
Moreover, it was - and still is - inherent to crises that it is impossible to foresee all events.
It is therefore not possible to include all eventualities that may occur during emergency
situations in legislation. This is why - next to a codified emergency law which is also
called objective emergency law - there has to be a provision for applying emergency law
in matters which are not dealt with by the emergency law, the so-called subjective
emergency law. This is to be adopted even when it would go against legislation which was
designed for ordinary situations. The legislative authorities were confronted with this
complex constitutional issue during the emergence of the War Law.
There was a consensus between the legislative and executive bodies concerning the
necessity of a national codification of the emergency law. This was a result of the
character of modern warfare which aimed at a sudden start and quick settlement. Further-
more, the battle field of such wars was vast, which created the need to proclaim extraordi-
nary wartime legislation over larger regions of territory rather than just fortresses and
fortified cities alone. The old French legislation did no longer provide for the new
demands in warfare, and was due for revision.
Application of the War Law from the mobilization onwards during World War I
showed its various shortcomings. Especially the lack of delegative powers and the issue of
legislative poweni of the military authorities. With respect to the delegative powers, the
decree of the Supreme Court of 1916 stated that these were not covered by legislation. For
that rcason, the Supreme Court did not acknowledge these powers of the military
authorities. With respect to the legislative powers, another decree of the Supreme Court in
the same yeaÍ stipulated that, in a state of war, orders issued by the civil authorities were
to remain effective next to those of the military authorities. Because of these decrces, the
War Law was interpreted in a formalistic manner by the Supreme Court, whereas the
military authorities were inclined to interpret - and use - it as a general guideline which
included a framework in order to deal with crisis situations adequately.
The military authorities were hindered in their task by the decrees of the Supreme
Court. For that reason, the government tried to eliminate any gaps or obscurities in the
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War Law during the mobilization and relied on experience. This initiative did not result in
the revision needed, since the draft of the law did not reach the final phase in Parliament.
The procedtue was postponed until May 6 1929 when the government requested the
Chamber to return the draft. The main reason seems to be that Holland had become tired
of the mobilization and allergic to anything that bore a relationship with war. Although
understandable, it was an attitude of irresponsibility.
Proclaiming the state of war or state of martial law in state-owned areas since the start
of the mobilization in 1914, was quite common contrary to historic literature. When war
continued across the border, the War Law served especially as a remedy for counteracting
smugglen. ln practice, application of the War Law did not lead to any serious difficulty
between the military authorities and the civil authorities, barring exceptions. This is
apparEnt from reports of the military authorities.
Like the announcement of the state of war or state of martial law since the beginning
of the mobilization in 1914, the discontinuance of this exceptional situation, depending on
the conditions in the locations concerned, took place in phases. It tumed out that civil
authorities, belonging to the Departments of Justice and Finance amongst others, could not
dispense with the assistance of the military authorities in most cases. This was especially
the case in border regions in order to deal with smugglers and control the passing of
aliens. Even during the mobilization, civil authorities insisted on continuance of the state
of martial law because they were unable to deal with these matters adequately themselves.
This is also apparent from the reports by the military authorities. It appears from these that
the military authorities, contrary to what complaints from the Dutch l,ower Chamber
suggest, did not intend to take over tasks such as police and customs services from the
civil authorities. The opinion that the state of war or state of manial law meant nothing
but distress for the civilian population and the civilian magistrators, is not correct. The
War Law was applied during the period between August 27 I9I4 and April 16 1920.
During the interbellum period, a revision of the War Law did not take place. In view of
the experiences during the mobilization, it was a serious deficiency that such revision was
not taken care of by the consecutive governments, since a revision of the law during that
period would not have met with any opposition.
In the main, three phases can be distinguished. The first phase concems the period
during which warfare as a means to resolve political conflicts was declined. This period is
characterized by a relative stability in intemational relationships from which Holland - as a
new member of the League of Nations - took benefit. There was a favourable climate for
revision of the War Law. This period lasted approximately until the early Thirties. The
second phase comprised the years following the beginning of the economic recession until
1935 approximately, in which year Hitler announced the German rearmament. Following
the emergence of radical left-wing and right-wing movements, these years are
characterized by measures of the central authorities to maintain the peace and quiet in the
nation. In that period, the government could also have adapted the War Law to modern
standards. The third phase comprises the years following the German rearmament with
international strains increasing, in which it became clear that Holland could not remain
neutral in a future war. If there ever was any need for alterations to the War Law, then it
must have been during this phase.
In none of these periods did the consecutive govemments show any initiative to revise
the dated War Law in order to be able to mobilize the country in a modern manner
constitutionally. There was a military draft of law in 1938, named after the advisers G.J.
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guideline for a revised War Law. Typicai of this draft, in conformity with the opinion in
military circles concerning strategic attacks, no mention was made of the state of waÍ as a
transitional phase towards a state of martial law. This emerged from general practice that
modern warfare would not be preceded by a declaration of war. FurtherÍnore, it is typical
that this dÍaft - again - bestowed maximum powers on the military authorities, to give
them the opportunity to effect their tasks to the best of their abilities. The opinion of Sas
and Caljé differed therefore from the decrees of the Supreme Court of 1916, but was in
agreement with the opinion ventilated in a book of the Ministry of Defence in that same
period which was titled 'Handleiding voor de uitoefening van het Militair Gezag' (i.e.
Guidelines for the execution of Military Authority).
A new War Law, based on the cooperation between two elements in a modern war, viz.
military effort and civilian defence, would have been the ideal solution. In modern
warfate, the entire population was involved and there was no longer any distinction
between combatants and non-combatants. It was natural therefore that civil bodies,
amongst others for their expertise in certain areas, should also have been granted powers
in order to be able to assist in national defence matters. This was not possible because of
mutual distrust between both elements in society.
In August 1939, it was again necessary for Holland to mobilize its armed forces. The
state of waÍ was proclaimed on the basis of the dated War Law, however with only a few
articles in force and therefore not applied in full. This came into being after a compromise
between the government and the commander-in-chief, who is also head of the military
authorities, a so'called 'gentlemen's agreement'. This compromise is evidence to the fact
that Holland was not prepared for an effective constitutional mobilization in 1938. As a
result, the De Geer government, installed in August 1939, was not capable or prepared to
endow the military authorities with sufficient powers.
The commander-in-chief, General I.H. Reynders, was reluctant to accept this agreement
and expected that the Minister of Defence, A.Q.H. Dijxhoorn, his former subordinate,
would succeed in persuading the government to proclaim the state of martial law in the
entire country. His hope was enhanced by the fact that the Minister himself, being a
professional serviceman, was in favour of proclaiming the state of martial law and had
promised the commander-in-chief to do his utmost to have this extraordinary legal
situation proclaimed. The expectations of the commander-in-chief however were not
fulfilled. The Minister of Defence proved incapable of persuading his colleagues to
proclaim the state of martial law. It is more appropriate to state that the Minister was
politically inexperienced and was no match for his colleagues. It took until November
1939 before some regions were proclaimed in a state of martial law.
Contrary to the period of mobilization during World War I, when cooperation between
the Minister of War, N. Bosboom, and the commander-in-chief, General C.J. Snijders, had
been good - a cooperation which came to an end in I9l7 when Minister Bosboom
resigned - General Reynders did not receive the support from the Minister of Defence and
government that would have enabled him otherwise to effect his responsibilities as
commander-in-chief of both army and navy and head of the military authorities adequate-
ly. He had many complaints. The fact that the government did not proclaim the state of
martial law at the outset of the mobilization, and other issues such as his guidelines to the
press, the establishment of mobilization clubs on a social-democratic basis, which met
with violent opposition from Reynders, and opposing views with respect to military policy,
all had a detrimental effect on the relationship between Reynders and the government, to
the extent that the commander-in-chief was dismissed on Februarv 6 1940.
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The central issue is that the differing professional viewpoints of the government - i.e.
Minister of Defence - and the commander-in-chief would not have developed the way they
did and personal feelings would not have escalated, if the constitutional relationship
between civil and military authorities in extraordinary legal situations had been laid down
in a balanced way in a modern War Law, with a proper constitutional delineation of the
position of commander-in-chief as a necessary proviso. Proof of the appropriateness of this
statement is that the government tried to create a new War Law in the second half of 1939
and first half of 1940, an attempt that was not supported by Minister Dijxhoorn. His
attitude was justified, as is apparcnt from the negative advice of the Council of State,
which body stated that the intended revision of the War Law was at odds with the
Constitution and that the time was unsuited for an alteration of the Law since war was on
hand.
Even when the personal relationship between the Minister of Defence and the coÍnman-
der-in-chief would have been less tense, both of them would have encountered hardly
surmountable difficulty in the execution of their tasks because of the lack of constitutional
regulations. Both of them, with individual viewpoints and responsibilities, served their
country to the best of their abilities. Their hope was that the improper constitutional
situation that arose at the beginning of the mobilization, could be rectified. The gentle-
men's agïeement of 1939 can be characterized as an emergency act which was disliked by
both parties and which called for too much improvisation.
The De Geer government was forced to improvise since it did not want nor dare to give
too much power to the military authorities, because it was convinced that certain interests
could best be taken care of by civil bodies. The Minister of Defence was also in a difficult
position because he did not succeed in convincing the government of the necessity to
proclaim the state of martial law in the entire country, which resulted in him being unable
to fulfill his promise to the commander-in-chief. General Reynders was unhappy and
disappointed because - being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and head of the
military authorities - he felt hindered in the execution of his tasks.
The main cause of this tragedy - a rightful characterization - was that all bodies
involved were, in a constitutional sense, up against the wall at the beginning of the
mobilization in August 1939 because of the failure of the various governments during the
interbellum period to revise the dated War Law or substitute it with a modernised version.
The government, i.e. the Minister of Defence, and the commander-in-chief, as highest
ranking military officer, were blamed. For this reason, all parties involved are entitled to
sympathy, whereas criticism of all authorities responsible on the eve of World War II
ought to be mild.
